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This year marks the 25th anniversary of the advent of the Left 
Front government in West Bengal, whose continued electoral 
success over such a long period is undoubtedly a unique 
achievement. During this time the nature of the West Bengal 
economy has changed much, in ways that reflect the principal 
policy priorities of the Left Front. In the rural sector the state 
has led much of the rest of the country, with significant 
acceleration in the implementation of land reforms, and 
institution of panchayati raj well in advance of the 73rd and 
74th constitutional amendments. With respect to comparisons 
of growth rates in foodgrains production and farm productivity 
across the rest of India, the state transformed its status from 
laggard in the 1970s to star performer in the 1980s. The 
benefits of this have been relatively evenly shared: the rate of 
decline of rural poverty since the late 1970s has also been one 
of the fastest. Contrasted to these impressive achievements in 
the countryside, the story is entirely different elsewhere – in 
industry, higher education, or fiscal discipline its performance 
relative to other Indian states has progressively deteriorated. 
Fortunately there appear to be some recent winds of change 
in policy direction of the Left Front, following a recent change 
in political leadership, and the message conveyed by voters in 
the 2001 state assembly elections.  
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Strategy for Economic Reform in West 
Bengal 
During the last two decades West Bengal has led the rest of the country 
with regard to agricultural performance and implementation of panchayat 
institutions. But these developments have begun to level out. At the same 
time the state has fallen behind in other sectors – industry, higher 
education and state of public finances, particularly – to an extent that is 
seriously worrying. This paper reviews performance of these different 
sectors, discusses possible explanatory factors, and makes a number of 
suggestions for policy reforms. With regard to industrial revival, it stresses 
public investment in transport and communication, measures to improve 
higher education, foster industry-university collaborations, and help small-
scale industries overcome specific market imperfections (access to credit, 
technology and distribution channels). In public finance, emphasis is 
placed on raising tax revenues (especially with regard to the service 
sector), limiting losses of public sector undertakings, and widening the 
scope of land taxes and user fees. In the agricultural sector, the need for 
a greater role of the government with regard to biotechnology, extension 
services, irrigation and flood control is emphasised, along with 
suggestions for encouraging and regulating contract farming with MNCs. 
Finally the article urges greater empowerment of panchayats with regard 
to social service delivery and agro-business development, and 
administrative reforms to enhance accountability of state government 
employees.  
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of different sectors of the West Bengal economy over the past 
two decades, and distill from that some lessons for future 
policy priorities. We start with the problem sectors first, where 
the need for new policy initiatives is greatest – industry, higher 
education and public finance. We move thereafter to discuss 
rural development and governance (including decentralisation, 
social services, and public administration), and argue there is 
a need for a fresh policy approach in these sectors as well.  
I 
Industry  
Industrial Decline: Facts and Possible Causes  
The crude facts of the last 20 years about the relative position 
of West Bengal industry are nothing short of stunning. In 1980-
81 West Bengal produced 9.8 per cent of the industrial output 
produced in India. In 1997-98, which is the latest year for 
which we have the numbers the share was 5.1 per cent, up 
from a nadir of 4.7 per cent in 1995-96. Organised sector 
employment actually declined in West Bengal over the period 
1980-97; in particular employment in the organised private 
sector went down from 10.84 lakhs all the way to 7.99 lakhs.  
A similar pattern shows up when we look at foreign trade. In 
1985-86 the Kolkata airport and port handled about 10 per 
cent of the imports and exports from the country while in 1998-
99 that fraction was around 4 per cent. Or to take a measure 
of the vibrancy of trade, in 1999-2000 the value of cheques 
cleared in Kolkata was just 6 per cent of the value in Mumbai, 
compared to 38 per cent in 1980-81. Even in the mid-1960s 
West Bengal was the second most industrialised of the larger 
states. By 1995-96, West Bengal was a long way down in that 
list, behind Karnataka and just ahead of UP in terms of the 
share of output from industry.  
What makes these numbers even more striking is the fact that 
this industrial meltdown happened in a period of relative peace 
and political stability in the state after the turbulent 1960s and 
the repressive 1970s. According to the report ‘Crime In India 
1997’,  West Bengal was 30th among 32 states and union 
territories in terms of the rate of IPC crime (this  category 
includes almost all crimes against private persons and private 
property) and Kolkata was 23rd among the 23 largest cities. 
Moreover this was a period when incomes and therefore 
demand was growing: per capita gross state domestic product 
grew at 2.6 per cent per annum in the 1980s and an 
impressive 5 per cent in the 1990s.  
Most remarkably, all this happened in a period when the 
industrial growth rate in the country as a whole accelerated: 
the rate of growth of industry value added was 7 per cent in 
the 1980s and 6.7 per cent in 1990s compared to 5.5 per cent 
in the 1960s and 1970s.1  This was after all the period of the 
software boom and liberalisation, the period that put 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Delhi on the industrial map 
of India. It would almost seem that West Bengal opted to step 
off the bus just as everyone else was getting on.  
The cliché about West Bengal, the most familiar story of how 
things could come to such a pass, is of course poor labour 
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invest in Maharashtra and Gujarat and buy themselves a 
much more docile labour force. This is certainly not what 
jumps out when we turn to the evidence on labour disputes. 
There were indeed a rash of strikes in the early 1980s: 
according to the West Bengal Labour Commissioner there 
were 78 strikes in 1980, as compared to an average of 22 per 
year over the period 1990-97. The average number of man-
days lost due to strikes in the eight years from 1990 to 1997 
was just below 17 lakhs. And if we leave out 1992, the one 
year when there was a really big strike, the average comes 
down to 6 lakhs, which amounts to less than one day per 
private organised sector employee in a year. The median 
number is even lower at 3.2 lakhs.  
It is worth putting these numbers in the context of other Indian 
states. The one year for which we have data from the other 
states is 1996. The Indian Labour Handbook tells us that West 
Bengal had only 16 strikes in that year, which puts it lowest 
among all the major states. These 16 strikes affected 27,000 
workers, compared to 143 strikes in Tamil Nadu that affected 
37,000 workers, or 129 strikes in Gujarat affecting 1,20,000 
workers.  
There are a number of possible reasons why these numbers 
might be misleading. Employers might have had to make huge 
concessions to avoid strikes, which would of course 
discourage future investment. This, however, is not what 
people say about industrial relations in West Bengal. 
Moreover, it seems inconsistent with the ready willingness of 
employers in West Bengal to declare lockouts. On average 
about two crore man-days were lost each year due to lockouts 
in the early 1990s. And while that number has come down 
since, it was still over a crore a year at the end of the 1990s. 
Indeed in 1996, the one year we can make an interstate 
comparison, West Bengal was the national runner-up in 
lockouts, with 80 lockouts according to the Indian Labour 
Handbook (and 144 according to the revised numbers issued 
by the state government). The government of West Bengal 
numbers also tell us that the number of lockouts in any year in 
the 1990s did not go below 120 when the median number of 
lockouts in the other states was less than 20. In 1996 West 
Bengal was also the state with the highest number of man-
days lost due to lockouts.  
The data on lockouts and strikes could be interpreted in a 
variety of ways. One is that anticipating labour troubles, 
employers were preemptively declaring lockouts, in order to 
put workers in a poor bargaining position. The other is that the 
intrinsic profitability of industry in West Bengal has declined for 
other reasons, and the increased incidence of lockouts is a 
response to that. Without a more detailed analysis it is hard to 
say which hypothesis is more believable, or whether both were 
relevant to some degree. But it is clear that the evidence 
currently available does not provide unambiguous support to 
the hypothesis that labour troubles constitute the only (or 
main) source of the state’s industrial decline. And that we 
should seriously look for alternative causes of declined 
industrial profitability.  
A recent joint study by the World Bank and CII based on data 
from over a thousand firms, provides some support for the 
view that low profitability is the key problem in West Bengal, 
Page 3 of 34 Article
18/10/2002 file://C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\ghatak\My%20Documents\maitreesh%20A-...rather than labour militancy. The study only reports data for 
the group of what they call the poor investment climate states. 
West Bengal, tellingly, is in this group, along with Kerala and 
UP. Value added per worker in these states is at least 30 per 
cent lower compared to what the study calls the best 
investment climate states (Maharashtra and Gujarat). In an 
effort to assess the contribution of various factors towards low 
profitability in these poor investment climate states, the study 
surveyed opinions of a large number of entrepreneurs. The 
entrepreneurs themselves believed that labour market 
rigidities, represented by over-manning of factories, is less 
important in these particular states than it is elsewhere in India 
(excluding the best climate states).  
While this is consistent with the evidence, cited above, on the 
relative weakness of workers in West Bengal, it should not be 
read as saying that the West Bengal government does not 
need to grapple with the issues of industrial relations. For even 
according to these numbers, firms in Maharashtra and Gujarat 
are much leaner than their counterparts in West Bengal. 
Moreover, a part of the reason why workers are in a weak 
position now may be that employers have chosen not to make 
use of labour-intensive technologies – which of course hurts 
both workers and  employers. And the fact that workers in 
West Bengal are less aggressive than they used to be after all 
these years of industrial decline, is no guarantee that industrial 
strife will not pick up as soon as growth revives. Finally and 
most important, strikes and over-manning are not the only cost 
of poor labour relations. If poor relations within the factory 
translate into a lazy or opportunistic labour force, productivity 
will suffer. If management has a lot of bargaining power, this 
might not hurt them so much; it will be the workers who will 
pay the price in terms of lower wages. Indeed we learn from 
the World Bank-CII report that wages are 25 per cent lower in 
the poor industrial climate states compared to the best states.  
Instead of labour relations, the report goes on to cite over-
regulation, poor infrastructure and lack of skills as the most 
important problems faced by the poor industrial climate states. 
Over-regulation is measured in the survey by the average 
number of visits to an industrial unit by a government 
inspector. There are almost twice as many visits in any given 
year in the poor investment climate states compared to the 
best states. While it is true that these visits are often a waste 
of time and have the potential of leading to corruption, it is 
somewhat difficult to believe that the over-regulation itself is 
the key problem (except perhaps in the case of very small 
firms, an issue which we will touch upon later in this article). 
One suspects that the direct effect of these regulations is 
dwarfed by what they represent – a government that is 
regulation-happy is much less likely to cooperate effectively 
with investors. Eliminating inspector visits will only help if it 
signals a true commitment to investor-friendly governance.  
The effects of poor infrastructure are much more palpable. A 
recent study puts West Bengal 14th among Indian states in 
1997-98 in terms of an index of infrastructure, as compared 
with 4th position in 1971-72.2  The index comprises (a) roads, 
railways, ports, (b) irrigation, (c) electricity, (d) telephone, (e) 
loan-deposit ratios of banks and (d) tax collection of the state 
government. In terms of each of these individual items, West 
Bengal has fallen below the national average whereas in 
1964-65 it either came first or second. These facts therefore 
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of West Bengal’s industrial performance relative to the rest of 
the country.  
Poor roads delay shipments and raise shipping costs – in 
some extreme cases, such as flowers and fish, delays in 
getting to the market can make production entirely worthless. 
A case-study of a failed mini-steel plant in Purulia in a recent 
report on industrial sickness in eastern India by Sudip 
Choudhury and Anindya Sen reports that each year the plant 
paid Rs 25-30 lakh extra for transportation (compared to the 
liquidation value of the plant, Rs 81.5 lakh).3  In terms of road 
density per capita, West Bengal happens to be far below the 
all-India average.  
Electricity is another key input to production. The Choudhury-
Sen report mentions many cases of firms that became non-
viable simply because they got less than the promised amount 
of electricity from WBSEB. There is some claim that now the 
power situation in West Bengal is less dire, but one wonders 
how much of this is a result of deindustrialisation. Moreover 
the power situation is reportedly much worse outside the 
metropolitan district. It is also worth emphasising that 
predictability of the power supply is very important for 
someone who is running a business. The report on sickness 
comes back time and again to the fact that investments were 
made on the basis of expectations of power supply that turned 
out to be over-optimistic. To avoid this, the government should 
draw up a comprehensive and credible power plan for the 
foreseeable future, that is then made available to investors. 
Indeed it may be worth announcing very specific power supply 
targets by district and then setting up a system of 
compensations that the government must pay registered 
investors in the district in the event of failing to meet those 
targets.  
The third piece of infrastructure is communication. While in the 
past this has been a major bottleneck, there is some reason to 
believe that this will not be the case any more. For one, the 
government of West Bengal clearly sees the link between 
investment in data transmission technology and the hi-tech 
industries that it dearly wants, and is trying to very hard to 
measure up in this dimension, with numerous recent initiatives 
to upgrade communication infrastructure in the state. 
Moreover, in the new liberalised environment, private sector 
suppliers may be expected to step in to fill in the remaining 
gaps and alleviate any bottlenecks that might emerge.  
This brings us to the last of the factors emphasised in the 
World Bank-CII study – the supply of skills. West Bengal has 
fallen behind a number of other states in terms of educating 
the young. In terms of primary enrolment rates for children 
aged 5-9, in 1993-94 West Bengal at 51.7 per cent was below 
the national average of 52.1 per cent and its rank was 10th 
among the 15 major states.4   A recent central government 
report puts West Bengal third, after Sikkim and Bihar among 
all states in terms of percentage of students who drop out 
before the secondary level.5  However, it still compares well 
with most other states in terms of the education of the current 
workforce. So a skill gap, measured by average years of 
schooling completed by currently working adults, cannot be 
the reason why West Bengal currently has low productivity. Of 
course, given that current achievements in schooling will have 
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possible that West Bengal will fall behind other states in this 
respect in the future.  
There are, of course, many different relevant measures of 
labour skill. It is possible that there may be a particular deficit 
in West Bengal within the category of the highly skilled. By this 
we do not just mean those with advanced degrees, but also 
the best carpenters, welders and commercial artists. Exact 
statistics on this point are hard to arrive at, though it is clear 
that now a very large fraction of Kolkata middle class families 
have one or more children living outside West Bengal. Some 
suggestive evidence can be gleaned from the placement 
statistics of the better engineering and management institutes, 
which suggests an abnormally large fraction of graduating 
students tend to find employment outside the state. Another 
way is to look at the data on migration. A striking fact about 
the last two decades is that migration into Kolkata has slowed 
very considerably, at a time when migration into Delhi and 
other cities has exploded. There was a time when young men 
of ambition from the south of India came to Kolkata to seek 
their fortunes – now that trend has been entirely reversed. 
Even the marwaris, the oldest and most well-established 
community of migrants into West Bengal, are no longer 
looking for gold on the pavements of Kolkata.  
This is of course what one might have predicted. The 
explanation goes back to the very essence of big cities. Big 
cities exist as a matrix, where different types of talent can be 
brought together. The best welder knows that his true value 
will only be appreciated by the engineer who aims to produce 
the highest quality. The best engineer, in turn, wants to work 
for the entrepreneur who aims to sell in the most 
discriminating markets and can only function if the materials 
manager knows to buy the best quality materials. All these 
people coalesce on the city where they are most likely to find 
each other. Moreover, the ambitious measure themselves 
against other people of similar ambition – it is no fun being the 
biggest fish in a very small pond. Therefore they all head for 
the city where the others are going. This is why big cities keep 
growing despite the crowding and the cost of living – this is 
why people are still moving to Mumbai and Delhi despite the 
fact that their commutes are interminable and their flats are 
minuscule. This is also why when the river of ambition 
changes course, it changes course so very rapidly. Once 
Kolkata stopped being a magnet for new young talent, the next 
generation of young talent decided to try their luck elsewhere 
and eventually even their older brothers and sisters, now short 
of young talent to work with, also decided that it was time to 
move.  
To make matters worse, the initial period of industrial decline 
in West Bengal (which is what stopped the inflow of talent), 
was followed by a long period (essentially till about 1990) 
when the state government had decided to focus all its political 
energies  on the rural areas. This may have been the right 
choice in many ways, but a combination of worsening roads, 
persistent power shortages and a general feeling of decay did 
little to make Kolkata an attractive venue for the young and 
upwardly mobile. On top of it, there was an explosion of upper 
middle class amenities (posh housing estates, clubs, discos, 
restaurants, amusement parks) in all the other major cities 
around this time, while in West Bengal, government ministers 
were telling them that western music was 
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leave.  
Since then Kolkata has indeed become a much more middle 
class-oriented city. However the experience from the US is 
that old industrial cities (Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Baltimore) 
continue to decline even after quality of life improves 
substantially (these days Pittsburgh often gets rated as the 
most livable city in the US). This is indeed what one might 
expect – after all for young ambitious people deciding where to 
go, quality of life matters less than being with other people like 
themselves.  
Industrial Strategy: Options for the Future  
Hi-Tech  
How does the fact Kolkata has been de-skilled and is not 
expected to recover any time soon, affect the way we think 
about industrial policy for the coming decade? The one clear 
implication seems to be that we should not pin excessive hope 
on knowledge-intensive industries (or what is more popularly 
known as the hi-tech sector) that will make Kolkata a 
Bangalore or Hyderabad overnight. These are exactly the 
industries where a high level of skill matters the most, and the 
benefits from clustering are the largest (what is Silicon Valley if 
not the world’s largest industrial cluster?). One way out seems 
to be to attract one mega-firm, which provides a hub for the 
industry, as Microsoft has done for Seattle. There are 
encouraging signs of late, with the recent interest shown by 
WIPRO and Purnendu Chatterjee’s group (and others) in 
investing in Kolkata’s IT sector, and the CII for expanding 
opportunities for IT training. But whether or not the cluster 
takes off remains to be seen. After all West Bengal is a late 
entrant among Indian states in this area, and the competition 
is stiff.  
Higher Education  
One key aspect of comparative advantage of West Bengal in 
this connection is in higher education. The state turns out a 
large number of well qualified students in engineering, 
services, besides the general arts and sciences, that could 
form the reservoir of skilled workers in hi-tech sectors. West 
Bengal leads other Indian states in the number of graduating 
students successfully passing the NET qualifications for 
college teachers. Yet many of them seem to leave 
subsequently to other states and countries looking for suitable 
employment. And from all appearances the demand for quality 
higher education continues to outstrip supply of seats in 
colleges and universities in the state. One hears of special 
trains to Bangalore run by South-Eastern Railways largely for 
students going there for entrance examinations for technical 
courses. The high demand for education in the state is 
mirrored also in the fact that West Bengal leads India in the 
fraction of students who get tutored (according to Anjini 
Kochar),6 and the high status traditionally accorded to 
education in Bengali culture.  
Indeed, the rich educational traditions of the state suggest 
going one step further, by treating higher education itself as a 
profitable industry where investment can be encouraged. West 
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in complete disarray and where well to do parents send their 
children to schools in Delhi. If West Bengal could provide good 
schools and colleges at competitive prices, it could easily 
attract a part of that demand, as it used to some decades ago 
when the brightest and the best from eastern India would 
come to study in Kolkata’s schools and colleges.  
To transform this into a reality, however, there has to be a sea 
change in the government’s policy concerning institutions of 
learning. There has to be a determined effort to create centres 
of excellence, which seek to attract and retain the best talent 
among teachers and researchers. This will require a sharp 
reversal of the trend in the last two decades towards 
excessive egalitarianism and politicisation in education. To 
begin with, the process of hiring of teachers is hopelessly 
politicised. After that, unconditional job security, use of criteria 
unrelated to merit such as political connections and seniority in 
promotions and transfers imply that teachers have no 
accountability. The government owns or funds most 
institutions of higher education and so it can get away with 
whatever it wants – just look at the sorry states that 
Presidency College and Calcutta University find themselves in 
today, in contrast to their past glory. There are few competitive 
pressures within the system to alter this situation. On top of all 
this, policies such as abolishing English as a language of 
instruction in public schools at the primary level has disastrous 
implications for essential skill formation in a globalised 
economy (although, the government has recently announced 
the policy of reintroducing English from class 1). Even 
countries poorer than India, such as Ghana, have been able to 
attract a lot of data transcription and operator services from 
the US on a subcontracting basis just by virtue of having low 
wage workers who know English and have basic computer 
skills. In Ghana, a country where the average income is about 
$ 380 a year, the best data processors make $ 300 a month.  
The best way to deal with problems in the education sector is 
to provide substantially greater autonomy to existing 
educational institutions by restoring the role of merit and 
productivity in such institutions, and encourage the 
development of an entirely new set of institutions from the 
private sector. Centres of excellence need to be free of 
political interference, be guided by norms of productivity (as 
evaluated by students and academic peers) and have 
maximum flexibility with respect to tuitions,  hiring, salaries, 
evaluations and working conditions. The government needs to 
woo investment from the private sector and from leading 
educational institutions elsewhere in the country and abroad, 
provide setup and facilitating assistance (in the form of land 
clearances, electricity and water connections and so on, and 
matching grants). Most important it needs to credibly commit 
to letting these institutions operate autonomously, and foster 
competition for students and teachers between new and 
existing institutions. If existing institutions lose their best 
faculty and students to the newly emerging ones so be it – 
nothing else will shake up the system better. The entry of new 
institutions could be encouraged at all levels, all the way from 
primary schools to high schools to colleges and research 
institutes. If schools with currently high reputation and in high 
demand want to open additional branches throughout Kolkata 
or the state – as Delhi Public School or Springdales has done 
in Delhi – there is no reason to prevent the same here. Indeed, 
if Delhi schools want to open branches in Kolkata, that should 
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limited to providing scholarships to needy students, and to 
filling in the gaps left by private initiative with respect to 
establishment of new schools.  
Yet another set of reforms pertain to bringing educational 
institutions and industry closer to one another. There are 
promising beginnings in this direction, with increasing 
emphasis on vocational and computer training in curricular 
reforms, and establishment of placement services in some 
existing colleges and universities. There is even greater scope 
for the encouragement and establishment of apprenticeship 
and adult education programmes that help small 
entrepreneurs at one end, and encouraging research joint 
ventures between research laboratories and hi-tech industry at 
the other. Indeed, commercially viable research laboratories 
are potential spin-offs from higher education. Given that there 
is still some demand for careers in research among Bengali 
families, there could be a future for privately funded research 
institutes that teach advanced students and do research on 
contractual basis, in biotechnology for instance.  
Industrial Strategy: Emphasis on Small-Scale Sector  
Having stressed the role of new initiatives in infrastructure and 
education, we turn now to the third and perhaps most 
important part of a new industrial policy – small-scale units at 
the lower end of the technology spectrum. There are many 
reasons to accord primacy to this part of the industrial sector. 
First, it is difficult to predict whether or to what extent the high-
tech sector will indeed take-off in West Bengal. As we have 
mentioned earlier, this is subject to a number of uncertainties 
– the state is a latecomer to the stage, with strong competition 
from rival hubs in the country. Where hi-tech clusters form and 
thrive is inherently difficult to predict in advance, owing to the 
interdependence of location decisions of numerous investors 
and skilled professionals. A slowdown in the information 
technology industry has set in worldwide since last year. It 
would be unwise for West Bengal to place all its chips on this 
sector alone.  
Second, investments in large-scale industry, such as Haldia 
Petrochemicals, are also fraught with a number of risks and 
uncertainties. Managing such a large joint venture between 
diverse stakeholders, and raising necessary finances has 
already shown significant strains. More fundamentally, the 
challenges of managing such large-scale enterprises are 
immense. The larger the industry (and Haldia Petrochemical is 
very large indeed), the more it relies on the skills of its 
management – personnel management gets harder as the 
manager becomes more remote from his workforce; materials 
management becomes demanding as the number and 
amounts of purchased materials grows, and so on. It is well 
established that at least in the OECD countries, managers are 
paid much more in bigger firms, which presumably reflects 
their heightened importance in such enterprises. The shortage 
of skills (management skill in this instance) therefore suggests 
large firms will suffer from poor management. The Choudhury-
Sen report makes frequent mention of poor judgment on the 
part of management as one reason why particular firms failed. 
It is also possible to see the preponderance of lockouts as a 
result, in part, of poor personnel management – firms had to 
close because they were unable to negotiate the right deals 
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project will indeed survive and prosper, it would not be wise to 
pin the prospects for industrial revival entirely here either.  
Third, and perhaps most important, even if hi-tech industry 
and Haldia were to take-off, how would that ensure that the 
resulting benefits spread widely, in terms of employment 
creation and wage growth for semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers throughout the state? There is a big market potential 
for West Bengal small-scale units in the supply of cheap toys, 
stereos, watches and household implements to the rest of 
India. This is what China supplies to the rest of the world, and 
has formed the basis of their phenomenal industrial success in 
the past two decades. One can add to the list of high potential 
consumer products the following as well: garments, leather, 
food processing, spare parts and metal-working, industries all 
of which have had a long tradition in West Bengal.  
The Chinese strategy is particularly attractive in being labour-
intensive and broad-based. Under what is sometimes half 
ironically referred to as people’s capitalism, a lot of China’s 
output is produced in relatively small firms located in small 
towns and villages. The reason is that the products have been 
so chosen that an entrepreneur with limited education, little 
capital, semi-skilled workers and no professional management 
can still achieve a high level of productivity. One also observes 
similar patterns emerging in Punjab, though with a different 
product mix. Indeed West Bengal also has a long tradition of 
successful small-scale enterprises. The engineering 
workshops of Howrah were once famous all over India, and 
even now the small garment producers in Metiaburuj and 
elsewhere in south Bengal have a substantial presence in 
garment retail stores all over India. Moreover, West Bengal is 
now flush with savings waiting to be invested. It has a higher 
rate of small savings net collection per capita than richer 
states like Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka and Andhra 
Pradesh. This is no doubt in part a result of agricultural 
prosperity in the state. A lot of these savings are presumably 
in small towns and rural areas, where labour is especially 
cheap. The diversification of agricultural production into a 
variety of non-food crops also provides promise for the 
development of agroprocessing industries.  
If West Bengal is so favourably endowed, the puzzle is why 
this kind of industry has not already taken off? What are the 
key constraints, and how can they be relieved?  
Infrastructure and Regulation  
One obvious bottleneck is the lack of quality roads. Even to go 
from Metiaburuj to Howrah ‘hat’, where garments are sold, a 
distance of less than 25 km, is a day’s work for the 
entrepreneur. If roads were better he would only need to be 
away from his business for half a day.  
Power supply is another. Small entrepreneurs typically do not 
have access to the schemes through which the government 
has tried to provide power to industry. This is a particular 
problem for them since they cannot afford the overhead cost 
of a captive generator.  
Over-regulation is yet another problem. Small entrepreneurs 
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narrow margins on which they operate, the bribes can 
significantly reduce their prospects of succeeding. The 
prospect that an inspector could come and shut them down 
soon after they spend their hard-earned money to buy a small 
machine, makes them reluctant to invest in the first place. One 
consequence of the fear of the regulator is that small firms do 
not register themselves, making them ineligible for formal 
loans and other publicly supplied inputs (such as power 
supply).  
The solution here is not complete deregulation but very clear, 
realistic and simple guidelines in specific industries of the form 
– if you have invested in this type of machine and have taken 
these few other steps, the inspector has to leave you alone. 
This has to be backed up by a crackdown on corrupt 
inspectors, necessitating the establishment of grievance cells 
where complaints can be lodged and followed up on.  
Training, Technical and Marketing Assistance  
Infrastructure shortages and bribes are not the only problems. 
Others include the supply of skilled and semi-skilled workers, 
the availability of technical and marketing assistance, and of 
credit from the organised sector. The government can take an 
active role in relieving each of these constraints. Even low-
tech industries need skills, in the form of primary and 
secondary schooling complemented with vocational training. 
The experience of vocational training in West Bengal in the 
past appear to be quite mixed, judging from newspaper 
reports. While there are some successful institutions, many 
others have foundered for the lack of adequate teaching staff 
and poorly designed syllabi. Efforts to improve primary 
schooling and vocational training programmes will be 
important here. One solution may be to provide subsidies for 
apprenticeship in existing firms, making use of the money from 
one of the centrally funded yojanas for the young unemployed. 
Opportunities of providing technical and marketing assistance 
to small-scale units should also be provided by creating 
entrepreneur networks with easy access to information and 
extension services provided by the government. Getting a new 
business off the ground requires defining a suitable product 
with a market niche either in the state or outside, in which 
small town entrepreneurs need the assistance of well-informed 
and well-connected intermediaries. Industrial expositions and 
trade shows both in and out of the state can also provide the 
required exposure, as well as access to Internet and e-
commerce networks.  
Credit  
Finally, we come to credit, perhaps the most significant 
constraint faced by small and new businesses. It is well known 
that most of the savings that formal financial institutions collect 
in West Bengal do not get invested in the state. Among the 
garment manufacturers in Metiaburuj, it is a rare firm that has 
any connection with the formal capital markets (banks, term-
financing institutions, etc). This reflects in part the fact that the 
Kolkata-based banks (particularly United Bank of India and 
United Commercial Bank) are now classified as weak banks, 
and as a result have become extremely conservative about 
new lending. But perhaps the most serious problem stems 
from the fact that bankers have become extremely suspicious 
Page 11 of 34 Article
18/10/2002 file://C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\ghatak\My%20Documents\maitreesh%20A-...of borrowers in West Bengal. The Choudhury-Sen report 
documents numerous instances where the bank refused to go 
along with a refinancing plan by the government and/or 
reputed consultants. This, in turn, reflects the experience of 
banking in West Bengal in the last 30 years. Time and again, 
investors have borrowed money, stripped the assets of their 
firm and declared a lockout. Of course, only a fraction of the 
investors actually behave in this way, but the rest get punished 
for it.  
A number of steps need to be taken to restore sanity to the 
system. First, the state government should put pressure on the 
central government to revive the Kolkata-based banks. They 
could be merged with other banks since privatisation is an 
unlikely option, given the political resistance that this is likely 
to elicit from their workers, and also the fact that no one would 
want to buy them at a reasonable price. Second, the banks 
should be encouraged to increase loan-deposit ratios within 
the state, with reasonable allowances for bad debts that 
prevent excessively cautious lending practices. Innovative 
schemes such as micro-credit can be encouraged to limit 
default risks, and mobile banking can increase the reach of the 
organised credit system to agro-businesses in rural areas. 
Efforts can be made to create information networks among 
banks that help them track credit histories of individual 
borrowers, which can also have a remarkable effect on loan 
repayment incentives. Third, the state government should 
institute a set of special industrial debt tribunals, aimed at 
speedy disposal of the many pending liquidation cases. These 
tribunals should have the power to bring immediate criminal 
proceedings against those found guilty of deliberate fraud 
against lenders. Fourth, the state government should take 
steps to prevent firms from delaying payments to WBSEB and 
other government undertakings for input purchases. The 
Choudhury-Sen report documents many cases where the 
immediate cause of the bankruptcy was the fact that WBSEB 
stopped supplying power to these firms because they had not 
paid their bills for many months. Making WBSEB tougher in 
terms of collecting it bills (e g, blacklisting any company 
associated with someone who has a poor record in repaying 
electricity bills is one way) will help avoid getting into situations 
where companies owe so much to WBSEB that their 
incentives get distorted.  
In sum, the strategy of encouraging the small-scale sector 
should be a multipronged one, aimed at alleviating the diverse 
constraints in the supply of key inputs faced by such units – 
infrastructure, credit, technical and marketing support. There is 
no need to repeat the mistakes of traditional policies for 
encouraging the small-scale sector, which were built around 
reservation of selected sectors and products for such units. It 
is very hard for a government to know and predict the kind of 
technology and firm scales that are the most efficient for any 
given sector. Moreover, reservations insulate selected units 
from the competition that is essential to foster the required 
cost consciousness and the incentive to adapt to changes in 
the marketplace and adopt new technology. Instead the 
emphasis should be on maximising entry and competition in 
every industry.  
Industrial Strategy: Summary  
The broad industrial strategy proposed here is based around 
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small-scale units specialising in light manufacturing goods. 
Above all, the guiding philosophy should be not to pick 
winners and pin hopes on a few select sectors, and subsidise 
these heavily. Such a strategy would be risky, narrowly based, 
expensive and subject to the risks of political capture by 
resulting special interest groups. The aim should instead be to 
create a facilitating environment for a broad-based and 
diversified industrial sector, of the kind seen in China or in 
successful east Asian countries. To make this feasible will 
require a substantial shift in how the government itself 
functions. It is by no means obvious how to make this happen, 
how to build a governance structure that is both more 
responsive and more able to stand back and allow things to 
happen.  
II  
Government Finance  
We turn now to discuss another leading problem area of the 
state’s economy: its dire fiscal situation. The state of public 
finances of the West Bengal government is currently quite 
alarming. Recent newspaper reports suggest that West 
Bengal’s expenditure on three heads in the current fiscal year 
– salaries, pensions and interest payments on past loans – 
alone amounted to 110 per cent of its total revenue. As a 
result the government will be borrowing not only to fund any 
development programs but also to pay its wage and pension 
bills (The Telegraph, May 30, 2002). West Bengal has 
resorted to overdrafts with the Reserve Bank of India as many 
as 134 times during 2000-01. During the past year only Bihar 
(283), Kerala (204), Manipur (263), Orissa (194) and Uttar 
Pradesh (209) had to resort to more overdrafts. The 
underlying reason for West Bengal’s financial distress is that 
its revenues are chronically and increasingly falling short of 
operating expenditures. The revenue deficit (i e, the gap 
between operating expenditures and revenues) in West 
Bengal  rose from 3.0 per cent to 6.7 per cent of net state 
domestic product (NSDP) between 1990-91 and 1999-2000.7  
In contrast, the corresponding ratio of aggregate revenue 
deficits to the aggregate NSDP across all Indian states was 
0.9 per cent in 1990-91, and 2.9 per cent in 1999-2000. 
Moreover, West Bengal had the single largest revenue deficit 
among all states in 1999-2000. As a result of the growing 
revenue deficit, the corresponding fiscal deficit (which adds 
loans and capital expenditures to the revenue deficit) in West 
Bengal has risen from 4.9 per cent in 1990-91 to 9 per cent of 
NSDP in 1999-2000 (whereas the all-state average went from 
3.3 per cent to 4.8 per cent over this period).  
What do these high deficit rates imply? In the short run the 
state government will have to find sources of borrowing to 
cover its operating expenditures. But borrowing sources that 
offer reasonable rates and are available at short notice are in 
limited supply. In the past when the state government has 
faced a crunch it has on occasion been forced to resort to 
borrowing from private sources (such as Peerless Insurance) 
as an emergency measure in order to be able to pay salaries 
and pensions to government employees. Since the fiscal 
deficits are now higher than ever before, the possibility of 
resorting to some such ‘creative’ strategies cannot be ruled 
out.  
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either new or maintenance investments in infrastructure, or the 
delivery of social services – areas where spending levels are 
more discretionary than the payment of salaries, pensions or 
interest on past debt. These are precisely the areas in which 
the role of the government in promoting growth and reducing 
poverty is the greatest. For instance, owing partly to continuing 
fiscal stringency the all-India average capital expenditures of 
state governments fell from 3.6 per cent of gross domestic 
product in 1980-81, to 2.4 per cent in 1990-91, and down to 
1.8 per cent in 1999-2000. In West Bengal this stood at 0.8 
per cent in 1999-2000, and 1.3 per cent in 2000-01, well below 
the all-India average. The per capita plan outlay during the 
Eighth Plan period (1992-97) was Rs 1,348 in West Bengal, 
the lowest among all states. The all-India average per capita 
plan outlay during this period was Rs 1,970, and states such 
as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Orissa and Rajasthan 
had outlays exceeding Rs 2,000 per capita.  
While we do not believe that we should make a fetish of fiscal 
aggregate targets, the situation in West Bengal does need 
correction. How can there be an economic revival, if the state 
has no money to spend to build roads, provide electricity, build 
schools and extend medical facilities?  
Sometimes fiscal crises serve to focus the attention of 
governments to the need for deep-seated reforms, which 
involve an entire government. We believe that such a time has 
now come. And for this, it is necessary to begin by 
understanding how the state government finances have 
reached their current predicament.  
Let us deal first with the most common explanation: the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay 
Commission. The need to revise upward salary and pensions 
certainly resulted in a steep increase in the fiscal deficit for all 
states: the all-India average rose from by more than one 
percentage point of GDP in just one year: from just under 3 
per cent in 1998-99 to over 4 per cent in 1999-2000, and 
almost 4.5 per cent in 2000-01. Yet, this is something that 
affected all states, so does not serve to explain why the West 
Bengal deficit is now almost twice the national average.  
Having said this, it is worth noting that the level of salary and 
pension payments in West Bengal has been consistently high 
(relative to revenue receipts) in comparison with other states. 
These payments formed 86 per cent of revenue receipts in 
1998-99 (in comparison with 78 per cent in 1990-91), whereas 
the corresponding figure was lower in Orissa (85 per cent in 
1998-99, 44 per cent in 1990-91), Kerala (61 per cent and 82 
per cent), Rajasthan (65 per cent and 34 per cent), Andhra 
Pradesh (47 per cent and 48 per cent), or Tamil Nadu (66 per 
cent and 53 per cent respectively). So salaries and pensions 
are high in relation to the state government’s revenues, not 
just now, but a decade ago as well. In 1990-91 only Kerala 
had a ratio comparable to West Bengal’s, and the former 
managed to bring it down substantially by 1998-99. Of course, 
this could reflect either the fact that the total amount of 
salaries and pensions is too high in West Bengal compared to 
other states, or that revenues are too low, or a combination of 
the two. This is a particularly alarming problem since pension 
payments are expected to grow all across the country, due to 
the increased longevity of employees. The need for serious 
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across the world clearly indicates.  
Before we address the importance of revenue performance, let 
us consider another possible contributing factor: the state’s 
debt burden. Could they be an important cause for the higher 
deficits in West Bengal relative to other states? In 1997-98, 
the ratio of West Bengal state government debt to GDP was 
23 per cent, which was close to the all-India average – with 
many states such as Punjab, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, 
Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Kerala and Assam recording 
higher levels of debt. However, this ratio has been increasing 
rapidly in recent years: it rose to 26 per cent in 1998-99 and 
30 per cent in 1999-2000. Similarly, the ratio of interest 
payments to revenue receipts in West Bengal was 31 per cent 
in 1998-99, which though high relative to the average is not 
out of the range of the other states (it was 38 per cent in 
Punjab, 33 per cent in Orissa, 32 per cent in Uttar Pradesh, 26 
per cent in Bihar, and 27 per cent in Rajasthan). This ratio has 
also been rising quickly in West Bengal recently, approaching 
40 per cent currently. Debt service ratios of the order of 30-40 
per cent are normally considered the upper limit of the range 
of safety. So going by the figures for the late 1990s, it does not 
appear that West Bengal’s fiscal problems owe their origin to 
an excessively heavy debt burden inherited from the past. But 
the debt service burdens are now threatening to become 
onerous. Indeed, West Bengal has been experiencing one of 
the fastest growth in outstanding debt and interest burden 
among the states over the last few years. However, this 
seems the consequence rather than the cause of the fiscal 
crises, since (as we explain further below) the process of 
rising fiscal deficits and poor revenue performance had set in 
much earlier in the 1990s.  
If neither expenditures nor debt constitute the main cause of 
West Bengal’s persistently poor fiscal performance, there is 
but one remaining possibility: a poorer record with regard to 
revenue generation. This is indeed borne out by the facts. The 
annual rate of growth of revenues during the decade of the 
1990s in West Bengal was 11.2 per cent, against an all-India 
average of 14.1 per cent. In this respect West Bengal was 
singularly the worst performer amongst the major states: even 
Bihar grew its revenues faster (at 11.8 per cent per annum). 
And West Bengal’s performance during the 1990s was 
conspicuously worse than its own in the 1980s, when its 
revenues grew at an annual rate of 16.3 per cent (against an 
all-state average of 15.9 per cent in that decade). Other facts 
can be adduced in evidence for the revenue shortage 
hypothesis. In 1998-99, own-revenue receipts formed 36 per 
cent of revenue expenditures in West Bengal, in comparison 
with an average of 49.5 per cent for all states, and 55.8 per 
cent for the group of middle income states that West Bengal 
belongs to (which includes Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu). As a proportion of NSDP, West 
Bengal’s tax revenues have fallen from 6.43 per cent in 1986-
87 to 6.04 per cent in 1996-97; among the major states its 
relative position fell from the bottom 25th percentile through 
most of this period to the bottom 10 per cent in 1996-97.8  The 
sources of the marked deterioration of the state’s finances 
relative to other states in the19 90s therefore owes more to 
poor revenue performance than any other factor.  
Unfortunately, there are no easy fixes to a chronically low and 
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long-term nature. As we explain below, West Bengal is by no 
means unique with regard to the need for such reforms: the 
problems afflict all other states as well, though to a lesser 
degree. But many other states have already initiated long-term 
reform measures, and it is imperative that West Bengal not lag 
behind. Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, 
Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh have brought out White Papers 
recently documenting the nature of the state’s finances, and 
outlining a medium-term plan for improving them, something 
West Bengal is yet to do.  
In what follows, we identify some of the main problem areas 
where corrective actions are urgently needed. Taxation of 
Services  
As with most other states, West Bengal faces a problem with 
regard to taxing the service sector. It is a normal pattern of 
economic development that the service sector at some stage 
begins to grow relative to other sectors, and India is no 
exception. The ratio of the service sector in GDP for the 
country as a whole rose from 36 per cent in 1985-86 to 41 per 
cent in the late 1990s. The service sector accounted for 70 per 
cent of the growth in GDP during the 1990s, compared to 
about 50 per cent during the 1980s.  
On the other hand, the bulk of the revenues of state 
governments are accounted for by sales taxes, which are 
levied principally on manufactured goods. A negligible fraction 
of revenues are accounted for by taxes on the service sector. 
Paradoxically, their role has been shrinking over time: the all-
India average for ratio of tax revenues accounted by tax on the 
service sector declined from 11.81 per cent in 1985-86, to 9.75 
per cent in 1998-99. So there is a general need to expand the 
base of indirect taxes to include the service sector, i e, 
transport, communication, banking and financial institutions, 
construction, media, education, health, and hotels and 
restaurants.  
How does West Bengal fare relative to other states in this 
regard? The share of services in NSDP in the state is 39 per 
cent, which is near the all-India average. But on the other 
hand, taxes on services as a proportion of NSDP are 
exceptionally low in West Bengal: it was 0.30 per cent in 1998-
99, compared with 0.54 per cent in Bihar, 0.63 per cent in 
Punjab, 0.64 per cent in Kerala, and at or above 0.80 per cent 
in all other major states. Gujarat achieved the highest ratio in 
this regard (2.29 per cent), i e, seven times higher than West 
Bengal. Yet the proportion of services in NSDP in Gujarat was 
41.8 per cent, only marginally higher than West Bengal. How 
does Gujarat manage to do so much better in this respect? 
Understanding the answer to this question is bound to be 
important. Or for that matter, why the ratio of tax revenues 
accounted by services in West Bengal deteriorated so 
markedly in the course of the 1990s: they fell from 0.82 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 0.30 per cent by the end of the decade.  
Improvement in state tax effort with regard to the service sector 
is now currently receiving high priority in most states, and 
forms part of the objectives of the transition to a value-added-
tax (VAT) currently in motion throughout the country. 
Accordingly, the cooperation of the central government and 
other states will be important for West Bengal. The transition to 
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inefficient and cumbersome system of cascading taxes on the 
manufacturing sector at multiple stages of production and 
distribution. It will also broaden the base of indirect taxation 
and allow greater uniformity between manufacturing and 
services on the one hand, and between different states on the 
other. By reducing high levels of distortions in costs, such a 
fiscal reform will undoubtedly enhance industrial growth as 
well. However, for a broad-based service tax to be feasible for 
state governments, a constitutional amendment will be 
necessary to place services on the concurrent list. Now only a 
limited set of services can be taxed by states, and the 
definition of these allowed services has already been 
stretched to the utmost (e g, the entertainment tax has been 
extended to tax hotels and restaurants) by state governments. 
It will also be important to coordinate minimum tax rates with 
other states, in order to prevent a re-run of the ruinous ‘races 
to the bottom’ across different state governments witnessed 
recently.  
So the extension of indirect taxes to the service sector is not 
entirely in the hands of the state government, owing to the 
necessity of a constitutional amendment and harmonisation 
with other states. Yet such an extension is vitally important, 
and especially so for West Bengal. Current estimates of the 
revenue potential from taxing different service sectors have 
been worked out on an all-India basis and the highest returns 
appear to be realisable for railways, land transport, pipelines, 
major ports, courier services, banks (excluding basic lending 
and deposit services), financial institutions, hotels and 
restaurants, media and education (including tutorial colleges, 
professional educational institutions, and computer schools).9   
Contingent Liabilities  
State government budgets do not disclose the full story behind 
the state of their finances, owing to a variety of accounting 
practices that enable them to circumvent central government 
restrictions on their borrowing. One item missing from state 
budget figures is contingent liabilities, which represent state 
government guarantees for loans taken by public sector 
undertakings from the market. State governments have 
increasingly resorted to this means for supplementing 
resources of the public sector in recent years, following 
discontinuation of loans to PSUs from the state banking sector 
since 1993-94. In March 1997, aggregate outstanding 
guarantees of 18 major states amounted to 9.1 per cent of 
NSDP, though this ratio has declined now to about 6.4 per 
cent in 1999-2000.10  Since many of the projects of PSUs are 
of doubtful financial viability, these contingent liabilities may 
end up being realised in the event of repayment problems, 
which will add even further to the state government deficit. The 
extent of contingent liabilities of the West Bengal government 
is not generally known, as it has not chosen to disclose this 
publicly (unlike some other states). We have no reason to 
believe that the West Bengal government’s liabilities are worse 
than that of other states in this regard. However the practice of 
contingent liability is of some concern precisely because of its 
inscrutability.  
Losses of Public Sector Undertakings  
Losses of PSUs also do not show up fully on state government 
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Moreover, a recent CAG report notes with concern that 
accounts in many of these PSUs are late by many years; the 
2000-01 West Bengal Economic Survey presents PSU 
accounts only until the year 1996-97. In addition, less than one 
quarter of the losses of State Electricity Boards actually show 
up in state budgets (through the direct budgetary) subsidy 
even though the state government is ultimately liable for all 
these losses. How does West Bengal fare in regard to losses 
of the State Electricity Board?  
Here, too, its financial performance is a distant outlier: in 1999-
2000 there was a negative rate of return of the order of 63 per 
cent to the capital invested in the West Bengal State Electricity 
Board, as against an all-India average (i e, averaging across 
all State Electricity Boards) of –26 per cent.11  The SEBs of 
Maharashtra, Kerala and Tamil Nadu were of the order of –10 
to –15 per cent. While there is some volatility in rates of return 
for individual states across different years, West Bengal is 
consistently the worst performer across all SEBs.  
It is worthwhile, therefore, to ascertain where exactly the 
causes of this dismal performance relative to other states lie. 
Here the detailed data provided by the Planning Commission 
Report is helpful. Costs per unit of electricity generated do not 
appear to be substantially higher than other states. Nor is the 
average tariff, which is also comparable. Transmission and 
distribution losses are above average, but not by very much: 
28 per cent in WBSEB, against 24 per cent in the others. The 
most important difference is in the plant load factor, which 
ranged between 31 and 36 per cent in West Bengal between 
1995 and 2000, compared to an average of 66 per cent for all 
the SEBs. During this same period, SEBs in southern and 
western India improved their load factors from 60 per cent to 
between 70 and 80 per cent. While the low plant load factor 
may partly reflect industrial stagnation in the state, there is an 
urgent need for a serious enquiry to study the various factors 
behind this problem because it has huge consequences for 
state finances.  
One other dimension in which the WBSEB differs from all the 
rest is the relative tariff on different classes of customers: 
commercial tariffs are substantially lower, while agricultural 
tariffs are higher. The pricing problem in West Bengal is 
therefore more severe with respect to commercial and 
industrial customers, unlike many other states where 
underpricing of electricity to farmers is a key problem.  
The speed of reforms in the electricity sector is another area 
where West Bengal is lagging behind other states. In Orissa, 
Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and 
Karnataka, state regulatory commissions have already 
restructured SEBs, dividing them into separate generation and 
distribution units, and issued new tariff orders. Such actions 
are still pending with the West Bengal state regulatory 
commission. Besides rationalisation of tariffs, initiatives to 
improve plant load factors at least to parity with other states 
should be an important initiative in West Bengal.  
Electricity is not the only sector where PSUs have been 
racking up spectacular losses. The West Bengal Economic 
Survey 2000-01 does not disclose the losses of the State 
Transport Corporation. But it does report that the accumulated 
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was Rs 2,786 crore, of Durgapur Projects was Rs 1,276 crore, 
and Durgapur Chemicals was Rs 1,670 crore. Collectively 
these three amount to more than the total accumulated losses 
of the WBSEB till that year (which was Rs 4,897 crore). If we 
combine the accumulated losses of these four PSUs we obtain 
a total of Rs  10,629 crore. To get a sense of what these 
magnitudes mean, they outweigh the state’s own tax revenues 
of Rs 6,513 in 2000-01, and form over 7 per cent of the NSDP. 
A recent CAG report finds that of the 11 statutory corporations 
and 69 public sector companies in West Bengal (with a total 
investment of Rs 14,000 crore of public money), not a single 
one has paid a dividend to the state government for 1999-
2000, as in most years in recent history. Commenting on the 
CAG report, a recent editorial in Business Standard estimated 
that at 10 per cent cost of capital, this means that on average 
these enterprises implicitly collect Rs 500 every month from 
each family in West Bengal.  
 
Small Savings Mobilisation  
One area in which West Bengal has progressed far beyond all 
other states is with regard to mobilisation of small savings, 
which amounted to Rs 2,024 crore in 1995-96 and 4,690 crore 
in 1998-99. In contrast Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra 
mobilised between Rs 3,000-4,000 crore in 1998-99, and most 
other states less than Rs 2,000 crore. Yet it is not clear what 
the implications of this are for the state’s financial position. It is 
important to realise that these represent a form of borrowing, 
rather than raising current revenues. So they do little to alter 
the fundamental structural problem of revenue shortage in the 
state’s financial situation. Moreover, these savings deposits 
often earn above market rates of interest, besides being 
eligible for various tax exemptions. So they may involve a 
steep borrowing cost for the government sector as a whole. 
The resources generated by the savings deposits accrue to 
the central government, a large fraction of which are loaned to 
the state government at even higher interest rates than the 
rates offered to the depositors. The fact that the state 
government is indeed taking these loans (when it can choose 
not to) suggests that the cost of borrowing under this 
arrangement does not exceed that from alternative sources 
available to it. The fact that the state is forced to borrow back 
these funds is thus merely a symptom of the severe financial 
malaise it finds itself in.  
Other Possibilities There are a number of other possible 
avenues for improving the collection of revenues in West 
Bengal as for most other states: introducing a wider range of 
user fees; improved enforcement of state excise, liquor, 
registration of motor vehicles and transfer of immovable 
properties and so on. The government has recently attempted 
to raise more revenues via user fees in education, health and 
water, something which needs to be encouraged. Reforms in 
state bureaucracies represent another potential avenue for 
effecting economies in expenditure, if there is sufficient 
political will. The state government can follow the lead of 
certain other states with respect to voluntary retirement 
schemes, converting DA into pension benefits, not filling posts 
when vacated, streamlining government departments to 
eliminate duplication of functions and those tasks rendered 
redundant by new information technology. Maharashtra has 
reacted recently to its own fiscal crisis by freezing DA 
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modified the policy of leave encashment and housing loans. 
An even deeper reform we will urge (in subsequent sections) 
diversion of responsibilities in some sectors such as education 
and health increasingly to panchayats, and reduce the size of 
the state bureaucracies in those sectors gradually over time.  
It may also be worthwhile to revive suggestions for taxation of 
agriculture, in the implementation of which panchayats can be 
actively involved. Despite recent revisions (that came into 
effect from April 2002) the land revenue still applies at a low 
flat rate of Rs 20 per acre above a fairly large threshold (4 
acres of irrigated land, and 6 acres of unirrigated land). This 
means that the majority of middle farmers do not pay any tax 
at all. Considering that they obtain significant benefits from the 
government in the form of subsidised inputs, and the 
substantial increase in agricultural productivity in the past two 
decades, it would seem reasonable to extend the tax net to 
holdings above 2 ½ acres of irrigated land. The levy could be 
conditioned on the nature of cropping patterns in recent years, 
and the yields realised over the last 3-5 years, with 
assessments carried out periodically. A suggestion for an 
agricultural holdings tax along such lines has recently been 
made by Indira Rajaraman and M J Bhende,12   modifying 
earlier proposals advanced by the K N Raj Committee and 
Amaresh Bagchi13  in the 1970s.  
The principal stated reason that the K  N  Raj Committee 
recommendations were not implemented anywhere in India in 
the 1970s was that it was considered too cumbersome to 
administer, though this often masked a lack of political 
acceptability mainly to the powerful lobby of rich and middle 
farmers. The subsequent modifications suggested by Bagchi, 
and by Rajaraman-Bhende seek to devise a version of the tax 
that is administratively workable, and levied only on plots 
above a certain size (two and a half acres in Bagchi’s 
proposal, and a threshold to be defined by local crop surveys 
in the Rajaraman-Bhende proposal). The administrative and 
political feasibility of such a tax would be considerably 
enhanced if local panchayats are actively involved in land 
assessments, and this is a subject placed for discussion in 
gram sansad meetings. To encourage the cooperation of 
panchayat officials, the panchayats could be entitled to the 
lion’s share of the proceeds from the tax. A similar reform in 
fiscal decentralisation in China occurred in 1985, enabling 
local governments to keep all local revenues above a fixed 
sum. The reform is widely believed to have contributed 
significantly to China’s rural industrialisation, and is worth 
emulating in the West Bengal context. If the panchayats 
become more fiscally self-sufficient, it can reduce their need 
for state government funds. Moreover we shall argue in later 
sections of this article that panchayats could be given wider 
authority over provision of local education and health, which 
can reduce the level of spending necessary at the state 
government level for these services.  
III  
Rural Development  
The Left Front, with some justice, views rural development as 
the one place where their strategies have clearly paid off. The 
1980s, the decade that immediately followed the takeover by 
the left, saw a remarkable renaissance in the fortunes of the 
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the slowest growth rates of agricultural production – whereas 
in the 1980s it was the fastest growing state with growth rate 
of 6.5 per cent for foodgrains production.14   There was a 
switch to high-yielding varieties, a shift towards cash crops like 
oilseeds and vegetables, and a substantial expansion of 
multiple cropping.  
Remarkably, given some of the fashionable prejudices of our 
times, all this was achieved in a policy environment that quite 
explicitly favoured the poorer farmers. This was the period 
when land ceilings were enforced, land was redistributed to 
the landless and the rights of sharecroppers were secured 
through Operation Barga. This was also the period when 
decentralisation began. Starting in 1978, a full 15 years before 
the passage of the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments 
made them mandatory, West Bengal instituted a functioning 
three-level system of panchayats. These panchayats have 
played an active role in the implementation of the land 
reforms, in the construction of roads and other local 
infrastructure and in helping people take advantage of various 
government schemes.  
The result has been that the benefits of agricultural growth in 
the 1980s and 1990s have been relatively evenly shared, 
which is probably not unrelated to the fact that West Bengal 
has been one of the states where the decline in poverty has 
been the fastest. The share of the poor went from 73 per cent 
in 1973-74 – the highest across all states in the country – to 
32 per cent in 1999-2000. The remarkable continuing political 
success of the Left Front must also owe something to it. And 
in the one case where we have hard evidence on this point – 
the case of Operation Barga – it appears that these pro-poor 
policies also contributed to the acceleration in growth.  
As is well known, every silver lining must have its cloud. The 
cloud, in West Bengal, is in part a consequence of its success. 
A large part of the growth over the last decade was driven by 
the expansion of boro rice production based on the use of 
high-yielding varieties and irrigation water. By now, most 
places suited for boro production have already made the 
switch and there is some evidence that at least in some places 
the process has probably gone too far: There is some 
evidence that the water table is not being replenished. More 
generally, the scope for further expansion of diesel tube-wells 
and canal irrigation seems to be relatively limited15   even 
ignoring the arsenic problem that has already become a 
serious danger in several districts. The state has in fact had 
occasion to buy extra water from Bihar over the last years. 
The switch to high-yielding varieties can continue for a few 
more years, but with 60-70 per cent of acreage already 
converted, it will not be for long. And it has been some years 
now that there have been any major efforts on the land 
reforms front, reflecting, no doubt, the fact that there are few 
easy options left.  
It is therefore no surprise that the growth rate has been 
slowing: Cereal production rose by 28 per cent between 1985-
86 and 1990-91. In the two successive five-year periods that 
followed, this particular growth rate fell to 14 per cent and then 
11 per cent. Similarly the growth rate of total agricultural 
output fell from a high of 15 and 16 per cent (over the periods 
1985-86 to 1990-91 and 1990-91 to 1995-96 respectively) to 9 
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might expect, in the absence of further innovations, 
agricultural growth in West Bengal is heading where other 
successful states like Punjab and Haryana have ended up – in 
a plateau of close to zero growth.  
This is not to say that there is no further scope for 
improvements in rice productivity. Rice yields in West Bengal 
are still considerably below those in compared to some other 
rice-producing states such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil 
Nadu. They are also low compared to neighboring countries. 
For example, the rice yield per hectare in West Bengal in 
1999-2000 was about 2.2 tonnes, while that in China was 4.1 
tonnes, that in Indonesia was 2.9 tonnes and that in Taiwan 
and Vietnam was 2.8.  
China’s pre-eminence in rice production owes in part to its 
success in introducing improved varieties that are better 
adjusted to the local weather and more resistant to specific 
pests. Many of these new varieties were developed by private 
multinationals working with the Chinese government. The 
Chinese government has also spearheaded efforts to develop 
genetically modified varieties of a wide range of crops: It is 
said that in the case of rice inserting genes from wild rice 
relatives into the best performing Chinese rice hybrids is 
reported to have raised yields by 20-40 per cent. It is true that 
many of these new technologies are yet to be properly tested 
and the associated dangers are real. Nevertheless, they have 
such immense potential that it would be foolhardy to turn one’s 
face entirely against them, especially given that they offer the 
possibility of escaping from the current trend of growing 
dependence on pesticides and chemical fertilisers. A more 
circumspect strategy, based on the Chinese model, would be 
for the state government to strike a deal with some 
multinationals in this area to develop crops suited to the 
particular local environment of West Bengal. At the same time 
it can appoint a panel of independent and highly respected 
scientists to evaluate the risks of the new genetically modified 
crop varieties.  
To increase crop yields and reduce pesticide use there are 
also significant gains possible from moving towards integrated 
pest management (IPM), which uses information about the life 
cycle of crops and their pests to determine the type and 
degree of crop protection needed in local contexts.  
West Bengal is also falling behind the rest of nation in terms of 
water management, perhaps under the illusion that there will 
always be enough water. Panchayats need to be strongly 
encouraged to build and maintain water-harvesting structures, 
especially in view of the continuing deterioration in the 
condition of ponds all over West Bengal. Wherever additional 
water resources are still available, the success of the pilot 
tubewell groups programme suggests that this may be the way 
of the future. Under this programme the wells are dug with 
public money but then a beneficiary group of small and 
marginal farmers is formed and assigned responsibility for 
repair and maintenance of the tubewell. On most accounts this 
is working remarkably well, in welcome contrast to the usual 
sight of broken-down public tubewells all over north India. In 
some cases these groups have reportedly approached the 
minor irrigation department of the West Bengal government for 
more public tubewells in their village, which they are prepared 
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and welcome instance of local responsibility in resource 
mobilisation. Finally, the state government needs to be much 
more concerned with flood control. Floods have become 
increasingly frequent in West Bengal, with devastating 
consequences for farmers. This is in part a matter of building 
permanent structures but it clearly also needs better 
environmental management in the uplands in collaboration 
with Bangladesh and Nepal, and with possible help from 
international agencies.  
Unfortunately even with all these improvements, it is not clear 
that the future of West Bengal lies in growing more and more 
rice. For one, the demand for West Bengal grown rice is not 
growing as fast as supply, with the consequence that prices 
have fallen sharply in recent years. While it is true that a part 
of the problem is that the central government is not putting 
enough money into the public distribution system, it is hard, 
given the present political climate in the country, to imagine 
that this would be reversed in the near future. In the 
meanwhile, the farmers face a very serious problem.  
More importantly, the hothouse-like climate that Kolkatans 
love to complain about makes the state an ideal place to grow 
vegetable, fruits and flowers. West Bengal already leads the 
country in vegetable production and the trend is towards even 
more: Acreage under vegetables grew by more than 20 per 
cent in the period 1995-96 to 1999-2000 to reach just over 11 
lakh hectares. Prospects for further growth in this area seem 
excellent. The state government, based on the recent Policy 
Paper on Agriculture, seems to agree, though it also reiterates 
the need to continue to pursue self-sufficiency in food: This is 
mysterious – does one really expect the rest of country to 
declare war on West Bengal sometime soon? Otherwise why 
shouldn’t Bengal buy rice from Andhra Pradesh and sell them 
vegetables?  
The Policy Paper and the McKinsey report commissioned by 
the state government also seem to agree on much of what 
needs to be done to promote agricultural growth – farmers 
need better roads to get the produce to the market, better 
storage facilities and massive investment in the agro-
processing sector. The establishment of Agro-Export Zones, 
proposed in the Policy Paper, is an excellent way to 
encourage the processing industry, especially if firms set up in 
these zones can be partially insulated from the state 
regulatory machinery. In particular, it will be important to de-
reserve the agro-processing industry, now earmarked for the 
small-scale sector  
Moreover we feel that the government should consider 
schemes for encouraging panchayats and other community 
organisations to get involved in the development of local agro-
processing industries, along the lines of the sugar 
cooperatives in Maharashtra and the township and village 
enterprises in China. In both these cases industries sponsored 
by the state but run by community bodies spearheaded 
development in the surrounding area and in principle, the 
same could happen in West Bengal. The government could 
choose one or two districts with relatively well performing local 
self-governing institutions (such as the panchayat samity) and 
with a hinterland of better-off agriculture could be chosen for 
such an experiment. These samities could be provided some 
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some area of local expertise and potential. This may be a 
scheme of diversification into some cash crop, the 
development of agro-processing, or marketing products of 
household artisanship. Apart from paying interest on the initial 
borrowed capital and a premium on an insurance fund, the 
samity could be allowed to retain most of the money from this 
business, and spend the proceeds on any project of its 
choosing. These activities should not be subject to regulation 
by any ministry, apart from the usual periodic auditing of 
accounts. Over time encouraging such forms of collective 
initiative is likely to create incentives for local business 
development. Of course some of these enterprises are bound 
to fail, in which case they could draw upon an insurance fund 
(to which they have contributed upfront) to weather temporary 
losses. If the losses pile up and persist, the businesses should 
be required to fold up. A Left Front government that 
emphasises decentralisation, popular participation and the 
cooperative spirit of the people, should have the courage to 
experiment with some local cooperative ventures on business 
lines. Such ventures could generate substantial employment 
opportunities without degenerating into conduits for milking the 
state cow, the fate of many state-sponsored cooperatives in 
the past.  
Even if all these initiatives are taken and taken successfully, 
however, there are many reasons why farmers may not be in a 
position to extract the full benefits of dealing with the world 
market. Credit and technology are both constraints and while 
the state government can help, its current financial distress will 
surely limit what it can do. The more serious constraint is 
marketing. Consumers in the rich countries are increasingly 
reluctant to eat anything that is not guaranteed to be ‘safe’, 
meaning that their production has taken place in tightly 
monitored environment. Lobbyists and spokespersons from 
import-competing industries in these countries are always 
happy to push for even tighter regulations of imports of 
edibles, for obvious cynical reasons. This makes 
multinationals a vital intermediary in these industries. They are 
the ones that can deal with the regulatory machinery and have 
the requisite credibility with the consumers for being quality 
and safety conscious. It is foolhardy to think that a local firm 
(or a cooperative, according to the government’s plan) will be 
able to compete with these firms to get access to these 
markets. Just imagine what would happen to exports from 
West Bengal if someone spreads the rumour that the local firm 
is growing fruits on arsenic-infested land.  
This, we think, is the main reason to take the recent proposals 
for contract farming seriously. Under contract farming farmers 
will contract with multinationals to produce, say, pineapples on 
some fixed amount of land in the current year, and the 
multinational will promise to buy everything he grows at a fixed 
price.  
The reservations expressed by those who have opposed 
contract farming are certainly worth taking seriously. For 
example, if the contract involves putting the farmer’s land as 
collateral, there is a real risk of farmers becoming 
dispossessed. While many will agree that we do not want 
agricultural land becoming concentrated in the hands of a 
foreign multinational, there is nevertheless a case to be made 
for easing restrictions on land transfers. Land, after all, is the 
one collateral that a poor farmer has: making it impossible for 
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him to borrow. We may therefore want to consider an 
alternative arrangement, say one where the banks are allowed 
to seize land from defaulters but seized land is required to be 
resold to a landless labourer (from a list nominated by the 
panchayat) within some fixed period.  
A more serious fear is the risk that comes from dealing with 
the vagaries of the world market and the uncertainties of a 
new technology. In part this can be dealt with by setting up the 
contract so that the price is guaranteed at the time of planting. 
The government can negotiate (and enforce) some crop 
insurance contracts with commercial insurance providers, so 
that farmers are compensated when the crop failure is clearly 
not their fault (such as when the rain fails or when there is a 
pest attack that covers a large area). But even with these 
measures, there is still the uncertainty that farmers face when 
making specific investments in a crop (e g, scented rice) that 
may lose its market beyond the next few contract rounds. For 
example, Cargill – one of the model McKinsey companies – 
will plan to export both aromatic and nonaromatic rice through 
contract arrangements. But Cargill has faced problems 
elsewhere in India, and there is no reason to believe that the 
same cannot happen in West Bengal. What if Cargill shuts 
down its operations – where will that leave the farmers who 
have already invested heavily in the special rice varieties?  
For these reasons, and more generally to avoid ‘default’ on the 
part of the MNCs, the government should require that the 
multinationals place a substantial amount of money in an 
escrow account that is invested in some safe asset and is 
available for the court or the arbitrators to pay off the farmers 
in the case of a default. There may be legitimate fears on the 
part of the MNCs that such escrows may be applied 
indiscriminately in favour of farmers, and to avoid these it may 
be possible to design schemes which permit escrow amounts 
to be lowered in exchange for a history of good business 
dealings.  
Finally, to deal with the possibility of exploitation of contractual 
loopholes by MNCs to cheat farmers, it would be important to 
have uniform contracts negotiated at the gram panchayat or 
panchayat samiti level. The government can then provide the 
panchayats with technical assistance with the negotiation of 
the contract. Even after the contract has been negotiated, 
there is the possibility that the multinationals will find it 
convenient to reject a large part of the produce on quality 
grounds. This is in part a matter of writing a contract that is 
detailed enough (so many inches long, so many kilos each, 
etc) and in part by appointing arbitration boards whose 
recommendations are binding (in the sense that a firm that 
rejects the recommendation loses its escrow money). All of 
this would be easier if the multinationals involved have a name 
to lose and have operations elsewhere in the country. It is 
similarly important to establish the reputation of the arbitration 
boards by appointing those with high proven integrity and 
technical competence.  
The discussion of contract farming has brought up the spectre 
of the Neelkuthis reborn in some quarters. It is worth recalling 
that the Neelkuthis became what they became with the active 
connivance of the colonial state. If the present, avowedly pro-
people, government is confident that it has the will and the 
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it need to close the door on very real opportunities?  
IV 
Governance: Social Service Delivery, Decentralisation and 
Corruption  
As we remarked earlier, West Bengal has led the rest of the 
country with regard to implementation of panchayati raj. A 
three-tier structure of panchayat government has been 
functioning since 1978, elected every five years. In West 
Bengal the panchayats have been actively involved in 
implementing land reforms, in channeling the delivery of farm 
inputs and government welfare schemes. This has enabled a 
measure of accountability and popular participation, though 
inevitably mixed up with the shenanigans of party politics. 
While further research is necessary to ascertain their role in 
agricultural growth and poverty alleviation in the West Bengal 
countryside over the last two decades, on balance the 
expectation is that they have played a positive role.  
Nevertheless, the extent of devolution of authority and 
finances to local panchayats still remain extremely restricted. 
The West Bengal panchayats have virtually no financial 
autonomy, either with respect to raising financial resources of 
their own, or in deciding on the allocation of funds across 
different local sectors. They are merely agencies that 
implement projects in specific sectors that trickle down from 
above. The bulk of the panchayats’ budgets consist of 
centrally sponsored public works schemes (e g, those that 
used to be covered by the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana). The 
overall scale of these funds is determined at higher levels of 
government according to specific formulae, and are typically 
earmarked for specific sectors: roads, irrigation, etc. The 
extent of decentralisation of decision-making to the panchayat 
bodies is limited to deciding where a road project will be 
located, and to its implementation and supervision. The same 
goes for schemes for the allocation of credit, fertilisers, 
housing or old age assistance. The total quantum of the 
service available for the village is determined from above, and 
the role of the panchayat is limited to selecting the 
beneficiaries. There is little scope for an enterprising 
panchayat body to decide on the allocation of spending across 
different sectors. And less still for deciding to raise resources 
for urgently required repairs to a local road or canal, or to 
initiate a promising new project that will benefit a large number 
of local residents.  
In contrast, panchayats in Kerala are automatically entitled to 
40 per cent of all state plan outlays, following a landmark 
decision by the Kerala State Planning Board a few years ago. 
The local community then decides the allocation of these 
funds across different sectors. From various accounts, this has 
energised local communities in Kerala, encouraging high 
levels of popular participation in the discussion and 
implementation of local development priorities. In some parts 
this has led to remarkably successful outcomes. Consider for 
instance the Manjeri municipality in the relatively backward 
district of Malappuram in north Kerala, which has not been 
characterised by a traditional industrial culture. In collaboration 
with some social groups and bankers, the municipal 
authorities succeeded in converting it into a booming hosiery 
manufacturing centre, after developing the necessary skills at 
Page 26 of 34 Article
18/10/2002 file://C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\ghatak\My%20Documents\maitreesh%20A-...the local level and the finance.16   These and other award-
winning panchayats in Kerala dispel the common 
presupposition that civic bodies in the villages and small towns 
of India do not have the capability to take the leadership in 
developing and facilitating skill-based small-scale and 
medium-scale industries. Of course there are also many 
instances in Kerala where the panchayats’ attempts have 
been handicapped by a lack of expertise; as a result the funds 
were often spent on short-term populist or welfare projects, 
and less on asset creation.  
The past two decades have also witnessed numerous 
experiments in democratic decentralisation throughout low and 
middle income countries (e g, in Philippines, Uganda, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Mexico), most of which have been characterised by 
substantially greater degrees of financial autonomy. In those 
countries local governments have been devolved a substantial 
chunk of state revenues on a formula-bound basis. This has 
resulted in a more even and equitable spread of expenditures 
across regions. It has also caused major shifts in the allocation 
of government spending in local areas, with greater resources 
devoted to social services (roads, water and sanitation, and 
education). The available evidence suggests that these shifts 
are in accordance with preferences of local residents, and less 
with those of state bureaucrats located in district or state 
capitals hundreds of miles away. Surveys in these countries 
also suggest a decline in the extent of corruption in the 
delivery of these social services, with a larger fraction of 
services reaching the intended beneficiaries.  
This brings us to the other glaring limitation in the extent of 
devolution of authority to panchayats in West Bengal: primary 
education and health services, which still largely remain under 
various organs of the state government. In contrast, most 
other developing countries embarking on decentralised forms 
of governance have shifted authority over the control and 
supervision of local schools and primary health clinics to local 
governments. The need for a similar reform in West Bengal 
has been urged by a recent report sponsored by the West 
Bengal District Primary Education Project (DPEP).17   This 
report points out that many other states in India (Kerala, 
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Assam) have already 
initiated the transfer of authority of primary schools to zilla or 
gram panchayats. In West Bengal, however, primary and 
secondary schools remain under the authority of the District 
Primary School Councils (DPSCs, which form part of the West 
Bengal Board of Secondary Education), and various inspector 
bodies of the Directorate of Education in the state government. 
The DPEP project report pinpoints the critical problem with the 
existing system: limited accountability of schools owing to 
insufficient local supervision and control. The problem with 
government schools is partly reflected in the tendency of 
people sending their children to private schools, if they can 
afford it. Even though the teachers are not necessarily more 
qualified, particularly in rural areas, there is less absenteeism 
and greater accountability. The problem is also highlighted by 
the experiment with Shishu Shiksha Kendras throughout the 
state. Initiated in August 1997, there are approximately 8,000 
SSKs operating now. Each SSK is managed by a committee 
consisting of student guardians and gram panchayat 
members, and appoint teachers on a contractual basis. The 
Kendras are supervised by appointees of the zilla parishad. 
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Madhyamik Shiksha Kendras. Another recent development 
(following a West Bengal government notification in November 
1999) is that every gram sansad is to have a Village Education 
Council (VEC) consisting of teachers, gram panchayat 
representatives, student guardians and community 
representatives.  
Nevertheless, the DPEP report stresses the need to go 
substantially beyond these measures. They point out that the 
VEC and local panchayat bodies play no role with regard to 
control and supervision of the schools. The participation of the 
panchayat is confined mainly to such areas as building or 
extension of school infrastructure and procurement and 
distribution of textbooks. The formal primary education system 
is far too much in the control of uncoordinated and insulated 
bureaucratic bodies or institutions captured by large teachers’ 
unions, often impervious to local community needs. The 
general perception of respondents in the study was that the 
SSKs were performing better than the formal primary schools 
because of greater local supervision and monitoring of teacher 
performance, in spite of the fact that the formal primary school 
teachers were better qualified and much better paid. 
Panchayat members often could do very little on public 
complaints about teacher performance in the formal system: 
their protestations to the office of the District Primary School 
Council and the District Inspector were hardly attended to.  
It should also be stressed that these measures nevertheless 
allow a large number of regular teachers to continue being 
delinquent while drawing substantial salaries. This is neither 
fiscally sustainable nor justifiable on any grounds. The public 
education system should not become hostage to a group of 
unionised workers just because they are politically powerful. 
Moreover, the problem cannot be solved by using an 
alternative stream of informal, often under-qualified, teachers. 
These informal teachers will soon agitate for being 
regularised, thereby compounding the original problem. 
Decentralisation in the field of education cannot be effective 
unless and until the formal teachers are answerable to (and 
dependent for at least part of their salary on) local bodies in 
which parents of children are represented and have the 
authority to discipline delinquent teachers. If the legal and the 
administrative system are not up to the task in handling this 
problem, a popular campaign to identify delinquent teachers 
may be the only way out.  
Other problems described by the DPEP report include lack of 
coordination between the different state bodies involved in 
control and supervision, and of resources available to these 
bodies for inspection of schools. Teachers complained about 
lack of suitable infrastructure and about being directed to 
ancillary duties not related to teaching (such as routine office 
work, election duty, etc). Local residents complained about 
teacher absenteeism and lack of accountability to students 
and their guardians. All of these problems result ultimately in 
high drop out rates especially between primary (Class I-V) and 
middle level (Class VI-VIII) schools. In the survey carried out 
by the DPEP team, enrollment rates drop from an average of 
80 per cent and above in primary schools to under 30 per cent 
in middle schools, with particularly low enrollment rates 
(between 16 and 18 per cent) for minorities at the latter level.  
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report deserve to be implemented throughout the state. First, 
the VECs should be given the principal responsibility for 
control and supervision of schools. To avoid conflicts of 
interest, teachers should not be represented on the VEC. 
Instead they can serve on school management committees 
that are appointed by and report to the VEC. Second, the 
district inspectors should be placed under the zilla parishads 
and panchayat samitis, and their principal role should be 
redefined to provision of support and training. Similarly, the 
DPSC should be reconstituted as a specialised body 
responsible for training, evaluation and curriculum 
development. Third, teachers should be absolved from 
ancillary duties unrelated to teaching. Fourth, delivery of 
primary education, primary health, women and child-care 
services need to be coordinated in each village. Accordingly 
all functionaries involved in these services at the district level 
and below should be placed under the panchayats. Finally, 
necessary funds and training with regard to management of 
schools and health clinics need to be imparted to VEC 
representatives.  
Such an initiative is urgently required to carry panchayati raj to 
the next stage. Such moves are already under way in other 
states. Given that West Bengal was a pioneer in this area, it is 
imperative that it not lag behind the rest of the country. A 
superior level of educational achievement is necessary not just 
to secure a fundamental human right for all citizens, but also 
to encourage adoption of new technology and declines in 
population growth rates.  
A more dynamic role for panchayats in rural development will 
obviously necessitate an increase in the level of financial 
resources they have discretion over. At the moment the 
panchayats are largely dependent on the state and central 
government for their funding. The achievements of West 
Bengal relative to other states in decentralisation amount 
mostly to panchayats spending other peoples’ money in a 
better or more effective way. Genuine decentralisation 
requires a much greater effort in mobilisation of own local-level 
resources, and in that respect no state in India has yet made 
much progress. Given the deep poverty of our rural population 
and the preponderance of low-productivity subsistence 
activities, a relatively self-reliant public finance at the local 
level will take many years to build. But even under this general 
constraint there are many ways some local resources can be 
mobilised and the culture of dependency on the outside world 
in rural self-governing institutions reduced. This also enhances 
accountability, as general citizens are more likely to be vigilant 
if the local government officials mismanage or steal their own 
money.  
Following upon and extending the recommendations by the 
state finance commission, a reasonable number of taxes and 
fees (share of a modified agricultural holdings tax suggested 
earlier, some forms of stamp duty, amusement tax, education 
cess, user fees for some public services like water or roads or 
ferry ghats) can be earmarked for panchayats. Some projects 
may be largely funded by the state government, but include a 
provision for matching funds by the panchayat (extending the 
idea of the tubewell group discussed in the previous 
installment). All political parties look upon the local 
government as a part of a huge job-giving and patronage-
distributing machine. The electoral advantages for an 
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important to gradually shift the focus to asset creation as a 
well-defined goal of the local government (which in the long 
run can also be electorally advantageous). These assets 
should include infra-structural assets (such as minor irrigation 
or flood-control structures), human capital assets (primary and 
secondary education, public health and sanitation), and rural 
cooperative business development.  
Increasing the finances and authority of panchayat bodies is of 
course likely to lead to corresponding abuses of power. 
Accordingly there is a need for more intensive and 
independent monitoring and auditing of the spending and 
assessment of panchayat performance, involving a 
combination of citizen bodies, representatives of higher levels 
of government, and NGOs. At the moment the auditing 
process is very weak (and much too delayed) at best. The 
mandatory meetings of the gram sabha, where major policies 
and items of expenditure are to be discussed can provide 
some salutary checks. But in many areas the attendance in 
the gram sabha meetings is rather thin and the requisite 
quorum is barely managed. Kerala has had a similar 
experience. It has often been alleged that panchayat funds are 
mostly spent on the favorite projects of influential members of 
the majority party in the area. Accordingly, members of 
opposition parties and other citizens do not think their 
attendance in gram sabhas serves any purpose. The 
perceived tyranny of the majority party is potentially a serious 
problem that may undermine the legitimacy of local democratic 
processes. It was for such reasons that E M S Namboodiripad, 
a passionate believer in democratic decentralisation, had 
originally argued for partyless elections to panchayats. While 
that may not be feasible or effective in the current context, it is 
important to install some institutional mechanisms to 
counteract the tyranny of whichever happens to be the local 
majority party. One idea is to replicate at the panchayat level 
the model of the public accounts committee system that exists 
in the Lok Sabha: appointment of opposition party members 
can be mandated to key local committees with some measure 
of veto power over large spending programmes.  
Other Administrative Reforms  
In the recent past the state government has initiated efforts to 
restore ‘work culture’ in public offices. This is a difficult but 
important task, involving adoption of new social norms and 
serious negotiations with the powerful public employees’ 
unions. But such efforts are certainly important in restoring 
accountability to citizens among government employees. 
There is clearly a long way to go. No changes will be effective 
and sustainable until some well-defined and scrupulously 
enforced system of rewards and punishments is in place. The 
key problem is that productivity is difficult to measure in 
government offices. So simple mechanisms for linking pay to 
performance are difficult to devise.  
In this connection, the Report of the Administrative Reforms 
Committee appointed by the government of West Bengal 
(chaired by Ashok Mitra and submitted in April 1983) had 
made a number of suggestions for reorganising state 
administration. Many of these have never been implemented. 
In employee promotion policy the committee had suggested 
several steps: (1) broaden the scope of promotion in order to 
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dead-end jobs; (2) create an intensive system of training and 
instruction at all levels of administration to prepare candidates 
for the next level of administrative responsibility; and (3) 
introduce a system of quality assessment with equal weight 
given to seniority, the Open Performance Report or the Annual 
Confidential Report, and performance in an objective test set 
by an Examination Committee in consultation with the State 
Public Service Commission.  
We also urge the need for well-publicised norms and rules of 
work discipline, agreed upon by the employers and the 
employees in a particular division, subject to approval of 
higher authorities. Workers regularly violating those rules and 
norms should be brought to the attention of an independent 
disciplinary committee vested with quasi-judicial powers to 
investigate those charges and penalise those found guilty. The 
penalties should include suspension, salary reductions, denial 
of increments and promotions, and in some cases compulsory 
retirement. The ruling party will acquire credibility in such 
disciplining if a few exemplary cases of punishment of such 
workers (irrespective of party affiliation) are brought to public 
attention. Without that all talk of work culture will remain 
empty.  
Other procedural reforms could also help enhance 
accountability of governing authorities.  The monopoly of 
particular officers in granting some permits can be reduced as 
far as possible, so that the same permit or license can be 
issued by different offices. Bonuses could be based on relative 
speed of disposal of files, subject to minimum quality 
standards. The Report of the Administrative Reforms 
Committee had suggested the following norms for 
departmental functioning: “Where no new policy decision or 
new project is involved, no file should be detained at a 
particular point beyond three working days and in a 
department beyond a fortnight. Where it involves an issue of 
policy or a new scheme, the time limit should be three weeks. 
In the case of interdepartmental reference, the time limit 
should be a fortnight for routine files and one month where 
interdepartmental discussion is called for”. The statewide 
computerisation of government offices currently under way 
should allow a further reduction in these time norms.  
It can hardly be disputed that there is rampant and 
institutionalised corruption at the middle and lower rungs of the 
government. Particular government departments (PWD, 
police, excise and municipal property tax, irrigation) and public 
procurement agencies should be targeted for special 
investigations, and some egregious cases and punishment of 
the guilty should be publicised. Corruption thrives when there 
is a general perception of pervasiveness of corruption. Again, 
some exemplary cases of punishment and keeping the 
campaign sustained (and blind to party affiliation) are 
absolutely essential to make a dent on the problem. This has 
to be supplemented by vigorous auditing, performance 
evaluation by independent bodies, scrutiny of large contracts 
and procurements, incentives to whistle-blowers, etc. The 
Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee had 
commented on how public complaints and grievances were 
handled with “a casualness, bordering almost on cynicism” – 
the situation has hardly improved since then – and suggested 
the setting up of Public Grievance Cells in each department as 
well as in each large-sized directorate and district 
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activate them in a time-bound fashion and empower them or 
some other bodies to punish the guilty. As we have already 
discussed in connection with decentralisation, mechanisms of 
accountability to the local users of the public service in 
question are also important. The adoption of a Freedom of 
Information Act (much stronger than the toothless one 
proposed at the centre), and involving non-party NGO’s in 
acting as watchdogs of government performance are 
essential. Unlike some other states in India, party politics in 
West Bengal does not give enough space to NGO’s often 
depriving the local citizenry of their important performance 
monitoring functions.  
Corruption is usually defined as the use of public office for 
private gain. A related but wider problem that afflicts the public 
economy of West Bengal is blatant privatisation of public 
space in various forms. The examples around us are simply 
too numerous and manifest: unauthorised occupation of space 
and beds in public hospitals and in student hostels, 
unauthorised structures in public spaces (whether for a union 
office or a place of worship), undue use by doctors of medical 
equipment and publicly paid time for their private practice, use 
of public schools and colleges by salaried teachers mainly to 
tap potential candidates for private tuition, unauthorised 
connections to public electricity lines and landfills of public 
waterbodies by promoters and the real estate mafia in cahoots 
with party bosses. They represent an insidious privatisation 
that has become entrenched over the years. Confronting the 
thick layers of related vested interests will be a politically 
challenging task for any reform-minded leader.  
V  
Conclusion  
In this article we have reviewed some of the critical areas of 
economic policy in West Bengal, highlighting the most 
important areas of concern, and suggesting policy directions 
for the future. Given that the new chief minister has expressed 
serious interest in economic reform, we hope our discussion 
will not only stimulate public debate but result in action. Even 
in areas where reform may be difficult, it is important to identify 
the key problems and recognise that they exist. Our 
discussion has been motivated by this pragmatic need to 
confront the facts as they are and to get the state’s economy 
moving again.  
Most of our policy discussions have been guided by a widely 
accepted conceptual framework in which market and state 
institutions are viewed as mutually reinforcing, rather than as 
substitutes for one another. Development in a market-based 
economy requires appropriate state provision of infrastructure 
and regulatory systems, absence of chronic deficits in public 
finance, widespread access to quality education, measures to 
reduce poverty and creation of safety nets for the vulnerable. 
With regard to industrial revival we have accordingly stressed 
the role of public investment in transport and communication, 
public encouragement and sponsorship of technology and 
education, and specific measures to promote small scale 
industries that overcome market imperfections (in credit, 
technology access and distribution channels). In the 
government’s finances we have urged the need for the 
government to raise more taxes particularly from the service 
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revenue receipts. In agriculture we have highlighted the role of 
the government with regard to biotechnology, extension 
services, irrigation, flood control, and regulation of contract 
farming. We have also suggested a wide range of 
administrative reforms to widen and deepen the scope for 
decentralisation, improve delivery of social services and 
enhance accountability.  
Embarking on all these policy initiatives will surely be a 
challenging task in the short run. Our hope is that they will 
help define the main directions for economic policy in the 
medium to long term. Considerations of administrative and 
political feasibility have played an important role in our 
thinking: the policies we have suggested are already being 
undertaken in some other Indian states and other developing 
countries. We have also tried to make suggestions that have 
the prospect of commanding a reasonable consensus within 
the state. This may mean that we are sometimes stating the 
obvious. But it is worthwhile to continue re-stating them until 
they become part of a commonly accepted policy platform, 
irrespective of whichever party happens to be in the 
government.  
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